Controversies around Aristotle's non-substantial particular

Which are the main interpretations of Aristotle's conception of nonsubstantial particulars?

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...nce are cross-cutting, so that Aristotle can come up with a fourfold divsion of entities:

(1) Things that are neither said of, nor in anything - primary substances, e.g. Socrates, Callias.
(2) Things that are said of, but are not in anything - secondary substances, e.g. man, animal, chair, furniture.
(3) Things that are both said of and are in something - nonsubstantial universals, e.g. color, literate, knowledge.
(4) Things that are not said of anything and are in something - nonsubstantial particulars, e.g. Socrates' white.

This means that we have to acknowledge both that there accidents which are nonetheless general and that there are particulars which are nonetheless nonsubstances.
We are interested in the last kind of entity in the above classification, the nonsubstantial particular. Prima facie, there should be no problem with its nonsubstantiality: it inheres, therefore it is not a substance. Similarly, its particularity is easily explained: it is a most determinate property, therefore it cannot be further decomposed, which means that it is an indivisible (atomon). But things are not so straightforward. The problem allegedly lies in the way Aristotle defines inherence, that is the IN relation.

Ackrill's interpretation

What has been considered a dogma about Aristotle's view on the status of nonsubstantial particulars says that the correct interpretation of how he defined inherence commits him to conceiving of nonsubstantial particulars as particular nonrecurrent qualities individuated by their subjects. For example, the particular shade of red instantiated by my shirt is only of my shirt, it cannot be instantiated by any other thing. Similarly, the particular shade of white which Socrates has is Socrates' white and nobody else's. This view is put forward, ...